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TIME TO QUIT PAYING THE PAYOLA PIPER: WHY
MUSIC INDUSTRY ABUSE DEMANDS A COMPLETE
SYSTEM OVERHAUL
"'They [record labels] created the.., problem, now you want
us [artists] to put a target on our backs?... The fear... is that
musicians who complain about indie promotion will be kept off
the radio. Without commercial airplay it's virtually impossible
to sustain a career.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stars are not born-they are sculpted, manufactured, and produced.
But for most record labels desperate to ensure radio airtime for their
recording artists, "stardom" in the music industry comes with a colossal
2price tag. While record labels may be willing to pay radio stations to
attain artist airplay, it is federal payola laws that stand in their way.
3
Although these payola laws were originally designed to prevent the
undisclosed payment of money or other consideration in exchange for
guaranteed radio airplay,4 both record labels and radio stations are finding
new and potentially destructive ways to circumvent the laws'
requirements.5 Gone are the days when simple promises of "cocaine and
prostitutes"'6 could entice radio station programmers to play a particular
piece of music. 7  Today, pay-for-play thrives in a $12 billion a year8
1. Eric Boehlert, Record Companies: Save Us from Ourselves, SALON.COM (Mar. 13, 2002),
at http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2002/03/1 3/indie-promotion/index.html?x [hereinafter
Boehlert, Save Us from Ourselves].
2. See discussion infra Part III.A.
3. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994); 47 U.S.C. § 508 (1994) (requiring disclosure of payments for
broadcast).
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
6. Henry Weinstein, US. Indicts 3 on Music 'Payola, 'Fraud Charges, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1989, at AI.
7. Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON.COM (Mar. 14, 2001), at http://www.salon.com/
ent/feature/200/03/14/payola/index.html [hereinafter Boehlert, Pay for Play] (explaining
"[d]rugs and hookers are out; detailed invoices are in").
8. Id.
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business where big money talks and everyone seems willing to listen.9
Although the practice of payment for broadcast may seem inconceivable to
listeners, the reality of the high stakes music industry is that songs must
receive airplay if both the recording artist and the record label are to
survive.'
Despite laws prohibiting undisclosed payment for broadcast, the legal
loopholes within these laws have effectively created a generation of payola
more dangerous than what the laws sought to prevent." This Comment
addresses the need for the restructuring of federal payola laws to better
accommodate the demands of a more efficient and "honest"' 2 music
industry. Part II presents a brief background on the origins of payola laws
and provides a basic understanding of their application. Part III examines
the current music landscape, including the concept of independent
promotion, while addressing how this landscape has been hindered rather
than helped by current payola laws. Part IV further examines the laws'
deficiencies and proposes an innovative solution to the payola problem.
Specifically, the proposed solution would allow payment for broadcast to
be partially deregulated in a manner that would eliminate the inefficiencies
of opportunistic behavior by independent promoters while providing an
organized exchange to determine hit record potential. " Part V concludes
that payola laws must be updated to better reflect the economic realities of
today's music industry.
II. BACKGROUND
The term "payola," originally coined by the trade publication Variety
in 1938,14 refers to the music industry practice of exchanging money or
other valuable consideration for increased exposure or promotion of a
particular piece of music.' 5 Today, the term transcends mere description of
the pay-for-play system in which it was formed to include practices of
9. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
10. Carlye Adler, Backstage Brawl, FORTUNE SMALL BUSINESS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 170[C],
LEXIS, News, News Group File, All. "For a band, airplay is like oxygen-without it, you die."
Id.
11. See discussion infra Part Il.A-B.
12. The use of the term "honest" to describe the music industry may appear to be somewhat
of an oxymoron. For the purposes of this Comment, use of the term "honest" will suggest the
goal of creating a music community that is not plagued with the unintended consequences of
payola scandal.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
14. KERRY SEGRAVE, PAYOLA IN THE Music INDUSTRY: A HISTORY, 1880-1991 1 (1994).
15. Id.
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bribery and corruption in almost any industry. 16 Although the most famous
public airing of payola arose in the late 1950s and 1960s with charges of
rock and roll corrupting the music community, 17 payola in the music
business has existed in one form or another since the industry's inception.1 8
The scandals of the 1950s and 1960s prompted Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") to conduct a probe into the
activities of many disc jockeys and their radio stations.19  Despite
subsequent federal laws passed to rid the industry of the so-called "evils of
payola," these attempts have proven unsuccessful. 20  Although the format
has undoubtedly changed over the past century, "payola has remained as
constant as the music industry itself."
2'
The pressures that have fueled payola for over a century remain true
today-more songs are produced than can be heard by the listening
public. Finite airtime in turn generates competition among record
companies that must secure airtime for their artists in order to turn a profit
by selling more records.23 Although the practice of payola has traditionally
dominated "Top 40" and rock radio, 24 the increasing pressure25 to sell
16. Id. at vii. For instance, the term "payola" has often been used in the political context:
"In the meantime, one can only hope the scads of dough being directed to the various campaigns
doesn't amount to payola, or as mayoral candidate Allan Hunter calls it, 'favour funding."' Bill
Kaufmann, Fringe Mayoralty Candidates Dilute Meaningful Debate, CALGARYSUN.COM (Oct.
10, 2001 ), at http://www.calgarysun.com/cgi-bin/niveau2.cgi?s=societe2p=48828.html&a=1.
17. See SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 109-11. The public really started to take notice of the
prevalence of payola in the music industry after investigations of popular radio deejays Dick
Clark and Alan Freed began to surface. Id. at 109. Although Dick Clark was later exonerated,
pioneer rock deejay Alan Freed was fired for taking payments from record companies. Id. at 110.
18. Id. at vii. See generally R. H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22
J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979) (providing a detailed account of payola throughout the past century).
19. H.R. REP. No. 86-1800 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3516.
20. See generally SEGRAVE, supra note 14 (detailing attempts throughout the past century to
rid the music industry of payola).
21. Id. at ix.
22. Jeff Leeds, Middlemen Put Price on Airplay, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2001, at CI
[hereinafter Leeds, Middlemen] ("Each year, thousands of new songs are released by record
labels, but only 250 or so tunes are added per station.").
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Chuck Philips, Radio Pushes Bands
for Freebies, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Radio Pushes Bands for Freebies]
(explaining that for record labels, radio is the most powerful tool in selling albums because many
people buy albums based solely on what they hear on the radio).
24. See Eric Boehlert, Payola City, SALON.COM (July, 24, 2001), at http://www.salon.com/
ent/music/feature/2001/07/24/urban radio/print.html [hereinafter Boehlert, Payola City].
25. Eric Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, SALON.COM (Apr. 3, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/04/03/payola2/print.html [hereinafter Boehlert,
Fighting Pay-for-Play]. "[T]he bottom line is the music business is wrapped in rampant
insecurity and revolves around one simple, short-term question: Where is the next hit coming
from? Period. And the strain internally at record companies to make those hits happen is
2002]
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records has caused both urban 26 and country radio to take the latest payola
plunge.27 And while "[s]teady touring, an Internet presence, glowing press
and MTV" may help to generate CD sales, "mainstream radio play is still
the engine that drives the music business. 28 While most other products or
services are able to advertise through other media, "such ads are rare for
songs., 29 Rather, the popular music industry must rely heavily on songs-
a combination of entertainment and advertisement-to push their message
to consumers.
30
A. Payola's Origins
With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934,31 the federal
government assumed the charge of regulating wire and radio
communications throughout the country.32 The purpose of the Act was "to
make available ... a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges. 33 Authority for effectuating the stated purpose of the Act was
centralized in the newly created FCC.34
Despite the FCC's power to regulate radio station airwaves, it was the
United States House of Representatives that brought the problems of
payola in the music industry to light. The House Special Subcommittee on
Legislative Oversight initiated the government's formal investigation into
immense." Id.
26. Boehlert, Payola City, supra note 24; Jason Bracelin, Foul Play for Airplay?,
CLEVELAND SCENE (Jan. 3, 2002), at http://www.clevescene.com/issues/2002-01-03/
soundbites.html/l/index.html. "Where urban stations differ from, say, those of the rock variety is
that, for one thing, it generally costs more to get on urban stations. ... Urban radio is so
competitive that it takes that much more money to grease the wheels." Id.
27. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25. "Now, after years of fighting the
exclusive, pay-for-play approach, country radio may be the final format to succumb." Id.
28. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
29. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at x.
30. Id.
Payola is also crucial to the industry as it is so dependent on radio airplay, and now
to a lesser extent on music video exposure. [If a food manufacturer] could not buy
shelf space it could still mount a big ad campaign in magazines, billboards,
television and so on. Rarely does the music industry do anything like that, certainly
not for an unknown artist with a first release. Efforts are geared almost exclusively
to radio exposure. A record must be played and heard before it is bought.
Id. at 221.
31. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-573 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 151.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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payola in November of 1959.35  Coming off of a well-publicized
investigation into the fixing of television quiz shows,3 6 the committee
decided to turn its attention to what was perceived by many as the "rampant
practice" of payola in the music industry. 37 The probe, focusing primarily
on small independent record labels, disc jockeys, and "rock and roll"
music, revealed numerous instances of tax evasion, bribes to disc jockeys,
and other outside influences used to persuade radio station programming
decisions.38
As a result of the subcommittee's findings, Congress amended the
Communications Act of 1934 by altering an existing payola provision and
adding a new section.39 Prior to amendment, section 317 regulated
payments received by radio stations in exchange for the broadcast of
certain materials, yet it did not address payments made to other recipients
such as disc jockeys.4 ° On September 13, 1960, nearly one year after
formal investigations began, the Communications Act Amendments of
411960 were signed into law.
The most substantial restriction on payola is found within the
disclosure requirements of section 317 of the Communications Act and the
FCC's own parallel requirements in 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212.42 Pursuant to
section 317, any radio station that has received consideration for
broadcasting certain material must disclose this fact along with the identity
of the person furnishing such consideration at the time of broadcast. 43 With
the addition of section 508, an employee of a radio station that accepts
money or other valuable consideration, or any person who willingly
supplies money or other consideration to an employee of a radio station for
the broadcast of any particular piece of programming must disclose this
35. H.R. REP. No. 86-1800, at 15-18 (1960); SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 100.
36. H.R. REP No. 86-1800, at 18; SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 100. See generally Quiz
SHOW (Wildwood Enterprises/Baltimore Pictures 1994) (providing an interesting perspective on
the quiz show scandals of the late 1950s).
37. H.R. REPNo. 86-1800, at 18-19; SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 100.
38. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 119, 120-58 (giving detailed accounts of the payola probe
in the music industry).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 86-1800, at 1-2.
40. Id. at 20. "It became clear that the Communications Act of 1934, in placing
responsibility solely on licensees, was inadequate. Since all the popular big-money programs
were broadcast via national hookups, the individual licensees had no practical control over the
shows or their production." Id. at 26.
41. Communications Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994)).
42. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 317.
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fact to the station.44 Section 317 similarly requires that radio stations
exercise reasonable diligence to ensure that this statutory duty is properly
met.45 Record label or radio station employees who violate the disclosure
requirements of section 508 may be subject to criminal penalties of up to
one year in jail and fines of up to $10,000.46
The 1960 Amendments, though purporting to regulate payola, did not
actually outlaw its practice.47 Thus, a deejay or station programmer can
take money from a record label to push its song so long as it is announced
to the listener at the time of broadcast.48 Although technically required,
these disclosures are rarely made.49 Most stations are unwilling to distract
the listener by peppering their programming with "paid for by"
announcements, nor are they willing to relinquish the image of impartiality
in programming decision-making. 50 To many, the disclosure provisions of
section 317 and the similar FCC disclosure requirements found in
§ 73.1212,51 were a "knee-jerk reaction" 52 to appease critics rather than a
true effort to stamp out payola in the music industry. 53 As a result, payola,
as prevalent today as when Congress first outlawed it in 1960, 54 has simply
taken on new and innovative forms.
55
44. Id. § 508(a) (1994).
45. Id. § 317(c). There has, however, been wide-ranging debate as to what constitutes
reasonable diligence. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that "[a]
duty to undertake an arduous investigation ought not casually be assigned to broadcasters").
46. 47 U.S.C. § 508(g).
47. Id. §§ 317, 508; Frank Saxe & Jeff Silberman, FCC Fines Radio over Adams Deal,
BILLBOARD, Oct. 28, 2000, at 87 (explaining "'payola is not accepting some kind of
compensation for airing something; rather payola is the failure to disclose it"').
48. 47 U.S.C. § 317.
49. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7 (explaining that most radio stations choose not
to make such disclosures as it unduly interferes with the flow of the broadcast).
50. Id. Stations "are reluctant to pepper their programming with announcements like 'The
previous Ricky Martin single was paid for by Sony Records.' Besides that, stations want to
maintain the illusion that they sift through stacks of records and pick out only the best ones for
their listeners." Id.
51. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999).
52. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 141.
53. Id. Other commentators criticized the congressional payola inquiry in 1960 by noting:
"No attempt was made to understand the phenomenon under consideration, to enquire what
would happen if the proposed legislation was passed, or to consider, if payola had adverse
consequences, whether there were alternative ways of dealing with it." Coase, supra note 18, at
306.
54. See SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 195-221 (examining payola abuses of the 1980s despite
the presence of federal regulation).
55. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
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B. FCC Sponsorship Requirements
The FCC may exercise its discretion to make factual findings to
determine if the alleged actions violate sections 317 and 508 only once a
formal complaint is filed.56 If a violation is found, the FCC must determine
what penalty is warranted, then turn the issue over to the Department of
Justice for enforcement.57  Violators may be subject to monetary
sanctions58 or nonrenewal of station licenses. 59 The FCC's determination
of whether to conduct an investigation turns on two preliminary issues: (1)
whether payment for broadcast has actually occurred; and (2) if so, whether
there was a disclosure accompanying the material that was sufficient to
immunize it.
60
Explicit exchanges of consideration for the inclusion of matter in a
radio program require disclosure even if payment is made to a third party.6 1
In In re General Media Associates, Inc.,62 where a hidden payment was
made to a third party rather than directly to a broadcaster, the FCC
nevertheless required an appropriate sponsorship identification. 63 The FCC
reasoned that "[h]ad the consideration for the inclusion of broadcast matter
been received by the radio stations... instead of by General Media they
would have been required to make an appropriate sponsorship
identification pursuant to section 3 17(a)(1) of the Communications Act.,
64
Even exchanges that involve nominal amounts of consideration may
require disclosure. In In re KMAP, 65 where a listener sent nominal amounts
of money to a station disc jockey to ensure the airing of a dedication song,
56. Southeast Fla. Broad. Ltd. P'ship v. FCC, No. 90-1482, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26581,
at *1, *7 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
57. Commission Warns Licensees About Payola and Undisclosed Promotion, Public Notice,
4 F.C.C.R. 7708, 7709 (May 18, 1988); see, e.g., United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.
1971).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 503 (1994); Commission Warns Licensees About Payola and Undisclosed
Promotion, Public Notice, 4 F.C.C.R. 7708, 7709 (May 18, 1988); see, e.g., In re KMAP, Inc., 44
F.C.C.2d 971, 974-75 (1974).
59. See Southeast Fla. Broad., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26581, at *6-*7. The Court of
Appeals upheld the FCC ruling: "The FCC has discretion to create its own standards for renewal
expectancy as long as it engages in reasoned decisionmaking." Id. at *7. While the FCC
possesses the discretion to deny renewal expectancy credits to existing radio stations, there is
little uniformity or oversight in their decision to do so. Id.
60. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999).
61. In re Gen. Media Assocs., Inc., 3 F.C.C.2d 326, 327 (1966).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 327.
64. Id.
65. 44 F.C.C.2d 971, 974-75 (1974).
2002)
650 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:643
the FCC determined a payola violation had occurred.66 According to the
FCC, the language of the Act clearly includes all matter for which payment
is made, such that the benefit derived by the purchaser of the broadcast
time is not the determinative factor in whether an appropriate
announcement must be made.67 Thus, the FCC's focus appears to be on
whether in fact payment has occurred rather than on the actual value of the
payment.68
In the absence of an explicit agreement, the FCC nevertheless
requires disclosure if an activity was intended to induce or has the practical
effect of inducing broadcast. 69  Radio station promotions such as record
hops, door prizes, or live entertainment supplied by the record label that
have the effect of influencing programming decisions must also be
accompanied by a proper disclosure. 70 Additionally, the common practice
of supplying radio stations with free records, even without an explicit
agreement for broadcast, must also be disclosed.71 Thus, while considering
the parties intent, the FCC conducts a fact-intensive investigation to
determine whether the exchange was an innocent business transaction or an
66. Id. On rehearing, the FCC affirmed the original decision, declaring:
Receipt of consideration by the station, directly or indirectly, is a necessary element
to trigger the requirements of Section 317(a) of the Act and [§ 73.1212]. In
general, we believe a practice of a licensee permitting its announcers to keep
money sent by listeners constitutes payment to the announcers in lieu of additional
salary, wages or bonuses, and constitutes indirect consideration ....
Id. at 975. But see In re Applications of Kaye-Smith Enters., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408 (1979)
(holding that nominal amounts of consideration did not trigger payola disclosure requirements).
67. Broadcast Material Sponsorship Identification, 25 Fed. Reg. 2406, 2406 (Fed.
Communications Comm'n Mar. 16, 1960) [hereinafter Sponsorship Identification].
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2406-07.
[R]eceipt of any records by a station which are intended by the supplier to be, or
have the practical effect of being an inducement to play those particular records or
any other records on the air, and the broadcast of such records, requires an
appropriate announcement pursuant to section 317.
Id.
70. Id. at 2407. "Although ostensibly it may appear that money, services or other valuable
consideration is being provided gratuitously ... the accompanying announcement shall clearly
state that such consideration is being provided .. " Id.
71. Id. The 1960 Amendment did, however, permit record labels to supply records so long
as the number sent was not unreasonable:
No announcement is required unless the supplier furnished more copies of a
particular recording than are needed for broadcast purposes. Thus, should the
record supplier furnish 50 or 100 copies of the same release, with an agreement by
the station, express or implied, that the record will be used on a broadcast, an
announcement would be required because consideration beyond the matter used on
the broadcast was received.
H.R. REP. No. 86-1800, at 20 (1960).
TIME TO QUIT PAYING THE PAYOLA PIPER
improper inducement.72
The FCC's sponsorship identification rules found in § 73.1212
essentially mirror section 317, although § 73.1212 adds more specific
disclosure requirements. The FCC rule provides that payment for
broadcast disclosures must specifically state that the material has been
"sponsored, paid for, or furnished, either in whole or in part, and by whom
or on whose behalf such consideration was supplied. 73 In earlier cases, the
FCC indicated that the exact wording of the identification should be left to
the station's discretion so long as the disclosure conveyed to the listeners
that the program had been paid for by the sponsor.74 The disclosure
requirements were later refined so that "mere mention of the name of a
sponsor" was no longer adequate. 75 Although the language of § 73.1212
clearly dictates the exact wording for sponsorship disclosure, the FCC has
nevertheless declared "the public interest would be better served by
continuance of our policy of dealing with the subject on a case-by-case
basis. '76  The FCC's case-by-case assessment of potential payola
violations, however, has resulted in enforcement measures that have been
inconsistent at best.
77
In recent years, the FCC's enforcement of payola violations has been
considerably lax.78 This reduced enforcement may be a result of numerous
factors, including the FCC's inability to take on large radio conglomerates
that currently possess powerful political influence, 79 unwillingness to
investigate in the absence of a formal complaint,8° or perhaps lack of real
72. Sponsorship Identification, supra note 67, at 2407.
73. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999).
74. In re NBC, 27 F.C.C.2d 75, 75 (1970).
75. In re Midwest Radio-Television, Inc., 49 F.C.C.2d 512, 515 (1974).
76. In re Termination of Plugola Rulemaking and Affirmation of Disclosure Requirement,
76 F.C.C.2d 227, 228 (1980).
77. For instance, in In re Gen. Media Assocs., 3 F.C.C.2d at 327, the FCC declared that even
nominal amounts of consideration required disclosure, whereas in In re Applications of Kaye-
Smith Enters., 71 F.C.C.2d at 1408, nominal amounts of consideration did not trigger payola
disclosure requirements.
78. See Chuck Philips, Clear Channel Fined Just $8,000 by FCC for Payola Violation, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Clear Channel Fined].
79. Id.
80. Brooks Boliek, Berman Chides Clear Channel, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 23, 2002, at 3;
see also Southeast Fla. Broad., 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS, at * 1.
But the FCC acts only if a formal complaint is filed that someone at a station is
receiving illegal payments. Since the new pay-for-play payola has become a
profitable part of the day-to-day business at nearly every pop music station in
America, who's going to complain?
Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
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desire or manpower to enforce the laws. 8  Regardless of the rationale,
because the FCC tends to impose weak punishments for payola violations,
the music industry has continued to disregard the laws' requirements
because it remains economically advantageous to do so. For example, in
2000, payola violations committed by Clear Channel Communications, Inc.
("Clear Channel"), the nation's largest radio conglomerate, resulted in the
imposition of a mere $8,000 fine.82 Such an inconsequential fine does little
to deter radio conglomerates such as Clear Channel-with gross revenue
exceeding $7.9 billion83-from testing the bounds of payola laws in the
future.8 4  Although violation technically carries with it a possibility of
monetary sanctions and license nonrenewal, because of inconsistent
enforcement, violation is a gamble the industry is willing to take.
C. The Impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The primary purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to
"promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers
and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies. 86 The Act was designed to deregulate broadcast ownership
by directing the FCC to modify its regulations of AM and FM broadcast
87stations. Prior to the Act, persons or entities were unable to own no more
than four radio stations within any given commercial area. 88  The main
impetus behind these ownership rules was "to keep [radio] ownership as
81. On the issue of whether FCC officials really cared to stringently enforce federal payola
laws, John Conyers, Jr., a ranking Democrat from Michigan on the House Judiciary Committee,
replied, "The environment for enforcement is not alive in America anymore. There seems to be a
new environment now, one that says unless you are a flagrant, notorious violator, no one will take
you to task anymore." Chuck Philips, Conyers to Press for Tougher Enforcement of Laws on
Payola, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Philips, Conyers to Press].
[S]ome wonder how the current system, which revolves around federally licensed
airwaves, has avoided close regulatory examination. "The Justice Department has
never stuck its nose in this far enough .... I don't know what exactly will trip the
[Department of Justice's] trigger if it hasn't already been tripped. There are
certainly enough smatterings of improprieties in this ordeal."
Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25 (alteration in original).
82. Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78. The $8,000 fine was imposed on Clear Channel
for payola violations in connection with the guaranteed airplay of a Brian Adams' song in
exchange for free concert appearances. Id.
83. Adler, supra note 10.
84. Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78.
85. See discussion infra Part III.
86. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996).
87. See id. § 202(a)-(b), 110 Stat. at 110.
88. See id.; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1) (1995).
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diverse as possible and keep the stations' focus as local as possible., 89 The
new regulations, however, set forth the number of stations an entity may
own, but adjusted that number based on the size of the applicable market.90
Thus, "in a radio market with 45 or more commercial radio stations, a party
may own, operate, or control up to 8 commercial radio stations."
91
Additionally, the FCC may "permit a person or entity to own, operate, or
control, or have a cognizable interest in, radio broadcast stations if the
Commission determines that such ownership, operation, control, or interest
will result in an increase in the number of radio broadcast stations in
,,92 efoperation. The effect of this deregulation is that ownership rules are
now virtually nonexistent, thereby changing the dynamic of station
ownership by concentrating the power in fewer hands.
93
When Congress increased the number of radio stations that any given
entity could own, many companies capitalized on this by purchasing
numerous radio stations.94 For example, Clear Channel merged with
AMFM, Inc. to form the world's largest radio conglomerate, with more
than 1,200 radio stations in the United States alone.95 Such consolidation
essentially redefined the environment in which record companies and radio
stations are now forced to operate.96  Radio stations "gain leverage in
89. Eric Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, SALON.COM (Apr. 30, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/04/30/clearchannel/index.html [hereinafter Boehlert,
Radio's Big Bully].
90. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b), 110 Stat. at 110.
91. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A).
92. Id. § 202(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 110-11.
93. See Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 89 (explaining "just a handful of companies
control radio in the 100 largest American markets").
94. See id.
95. Michael Roberts, Taking on the Empire, DENVER WESTWORD (Aug. 23, 2001), at
http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-08-23/feature2.html//index.html [hereinafter Taking on
the Empire]. Clear Channel currently owns stations in 247 of the nation's 250 largest radio
markets, dominates Top 40 radio formatting, and controls sixty percent of all rock radio.
Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 89.
[L]ast year, the company spent $4.4 billion to purchase SFX Entertainment, the
nation's dominant concert venue owner and touring promoter. Clear Channel also
owns a radio research company, a format consultancy, regional radio news
networks, an airplay monitoring system, syndicated programming, radio trade
magazines like the Album Network, 19 television stations and 700,000 outdoor
billboards worldwide. With so many resources at hand, the company has all but cut
off its business with outside vendors.
Id.
96. Philips, Conyers to Press, supra note 81. Representative John Conyers, Jr. explains that
consolidation after the Telecommunications Act has significantly affected the public airwaves:
"But now we seem to be going in a different direction. Less regulation. Less oversight. Less
enforcement. Competition is drying up. Monopoly is on the rise. The whole thing is becoming
more of a business and less of an arena for communication about new musical ideas." Id.
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negotiating programming and advertising contracts through their control of
a larger segment of the audience. 97 With multiple stations in the same
market controlled by one entity, the number of station outlets available-
should a station in one market refuse to air a song-is considerably
reduced.98 Moreover, due to nationwide consolidation, "the capacity to
leverage stronger stations in some relevant markets to anticompetitively
advantage less competitive stations in other local markets and regions" 99
has worked to the detriment of not only smaller radio rivals, but record
companies and recording artists as well.'00
This radio outlet shortage, exacerbated by deregulation, is what
produces payola in the first place.' 0 ' Record companies, realizing that there
is only a finite amount of airtime and radio stations on which to air their
material, are tempted to gain access to these scarce radio outlets by turning
to payola.102 New radio conglomerates hungry for revenue to compensate
for the expensive consolidation process are exploring potentially illegal
ways to increase profits through joint marketing airplay, promotions, and
free radio concerts. 0 3  Furthermore, consolidation has left individual
station owners in debt and searching for ways to turn a profit. 0 4 Thus, the
natural result of consolidation has pressured both station owners and record
companies to turn to payola for a quick solution.'0 5
97. Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, but What About
Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at D5.
98. Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 89.
99. James W. Brock, Antitrust, the "Relevant Market, " and the Vietnamization ofAmerican
Merger Policy, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 735, 748 (2001).
100. Id. at 748-49.
101. See id. (explaining "sheer size provides these [radio conglomerates] with what appears
to be a growing degree of anticompetitive power and leverage in dealing with recording
companies-a decisive advantage given the critical importance of air play to the commercial
success of recorded music"); see also Leeds, Middlemen, supra note 22 ("The promotion business
has gotten even tougher since the mid-'90s, when President Clinton signed legislation to
deregulate the radio industry. With only a handful of major radio companies left, it is even harder
to gain access and get air time for new music acts.").
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
103. Chuck Philips & Michael A. Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC to Probe Possible Payola,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at CI.
104. Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78 (explaining that "huge conglomerates created by
the merger wave are particularly hungry for new revenue to justify their expansions. Merging is
an expensive process that often leaves the surviving company saddled with debt"); Patrick M.
Reilly, Radio's New Spin on an Oldie: Pay-for-Play, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1998, at B 1.
105. See Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78; see also Chuck Philips, Radio Exec's Claims
of Payola Draw Fire, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at C I [hereinafter Philips, Radio Exec's Claims]
("Industry mergers have moved the balance of power to radio groups, which today have the clout
to launch a song simultaneously in scores of markets across the country-or consign it to
oblivion.").
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III. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE Music LANDSCAPE
The music landscape has changed considerably since November 1959
when the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight initiated
its first investigation into payola. "Rock and Roll," once thought of as the
evil that spawned payola, 0 6 has since become a staple of America's
musical taste. 0 7 Radio, once the only real medium for artists to expose
their crafts, now faces competition from music videos and the downloading
of music files over the Internet. 0 8  With the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, radio stations, once individually owned
and operated, have turned into huge conglomerates with station ownership
now concentrated in fewer hands. 0 9 Despite these transformations, the
payola laws, written in 1960, have not evolved to adequately reflect or
inhibit instances of payola in today's music landscape." 0 The payola of
today is a natural and creative response to laws that in theory wanted to
bring about its demise but in practice failed to provide the adequate
weaponry.
A. It's Not "Technically" Payola: An Intricate Web ofActors Is Born to
Avoid Detection
In their failure to draft laws to adequately prohibit payola, the FCC
and Congress may have paved the way for a generation of payola that is
arguably more destructive than what the laws originally sought to prevent.
The loopholes created by sections 317 and 508 may have been the result
either of Congress' desire to protect a free enterprise system or a fear that a
106. See SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 90-92. A common sentiment regarding rock music in
the late 1950s was that "much of the juvenile stuff [rock music] pumped over the airwaves these
days hardly qualifies as music." Id. at 92. The congressmen on the subcommittee were
consistently hostile to rock and roll, defining it as "raucous sound" that could only have been
forced on the public through the use of illegal payola practices. Responsibilities of Broadcasting
Licensees and Station Personnel: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate
& Foreign Commerce on Payola and Other Deceptive Practices in the Broadcasting Field, 86th
Cong. 869, 870 (1960).
107. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at viii-ix; see also Limp Bizkit Top I Million with First-Week
Sales (Oct. 25, 2000), at http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1431237/20001025/story.jhtml
(noting that hard rock act Limp Bizkit's sale of over one million copies in the first week of
release places the band as one of the top first-week album sellers of all time).
108. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7. "Steady touring, an Internet presence,
glowing press and MTV help, of course, but mainstream radio play is still the engine that drives
the music business." Id.
109. Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 89; see also text accompanying notes 95-96.
110. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25 (explaining that the payola laws are
both out of date and irrelevant to today's marketplace).
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complete ban may be unconstitutional."1 Regardless of the rationale, the
music industry has successfully adapted to the payola laws by exploiting
their glaring deficiencies.112 The primary tool used to make a mockery of
payola laws has no elaborate maker or convoluted design; rather, it is the
pure and simple use of a middleman. 113
Independent record promoters, or "indies"' 14 as they are known in the
music business, thwart the requirements of the payola statutes by acting as
"high-priced toll collector[s]" between record labels and radio stations.!
5
Because radio stations are one step removed from record label money,
these payments are not technically payola. 116 Prior to the late 1970s and
early 1980s, the requirements of sections 317 and 508 posed little credible
threat to record labels found in violation of payola statutes because the
probability of criminal prosecution was remote." 7 What compounded the
risk of engaging in payola was the increase in litigation growing out of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") 118 in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. 119 Although sections 317 and 508 were held in
1975 not to imply a private cause of action,1 20 when used in conjunction
with RICO the expected penalty costs of private treble damages for
engaging in payola-like violations increased considerably.' 21  Record
111. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
112. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25 (discussing the intricacies of the
independent promotion system).
113. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7 (describing independent promoters as
"shadowy middlemen").
114. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25. Indies are also sometimes referred
to as "quarterbacks" in the music industry. Philips, Radio Exec's Claims, supra note 105.
115. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
116. Id.
117. The FCC will not investigate allegations of payola unless a formal complaint is filed.
See, e.g., In re Application of KMAP, Inc., 63 F.C.C.2d 470, 479 (1977). It is then the
responsibility of the Department of Justice to prosecute alleged violations of section 508. See id.
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
119. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985). "Congress originally
intended RICO to be applicable only to situations where known members of organized crime had
infiltrated legitimate businesses. In practice the civil provisions of the statute have been used to
redress wrongs in a wide variety of cases, including those throughout the entertainment industry."
Steven Jay Gabe, Use of RICO in Entertainment Suits, ENT. L. & FIN., Oct. 1991, at 3.
120. Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1054-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; J. Gregory Sidak & David E. Kronemyer, The "New
Payola" and the American Record Industry: Transactions Costs and Precautionary Ignorance in
Contracts for Illicit Services, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 537-39 (1987). In one of the
most infamous payola scandals in music history, Joseph Isgro, a heavyweight independent
promoter with alleged mob connections, was indicted in 1989 on various counts, including the
violation of RICO anti-racketeering statutes as well as violation of payola statutes. Weinstein,
supra note 6. The charges against Isgro were dropped in 1990 because of prosecutorial
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companies now had an added incentive to cease their questionable in-house
promotional activities and delegate all responsibilities to an outside
player. 1
22
With only a finite amount of material that can be played on any given
station, indies can serve as lobbyists for their client record companies by
supplying radio stations with "pertinent information and data related to the
quality and nature of the recording, its likely demographic appeal, its
advertising support, sales performance and, ultimately, the likelihood of its
public acceptance as a 'hit record."",123  Although indies can serve this
legitimate role, 124 that role takes a back seat to their primary goal of
persuading station program directors that the addition of a particular song
to the station's playlist will increase listener demand, thus increasing the
station's advertising demand. 125  The persuasive techniques employed-
and the rising costs of such techniques126--now have the industry
misconduct, were retried in 1995, and subsequently thrown out in 1996. Chris Morris, Isgro
Faces Possibility of New Trial, BILLBOARD, Jan. 28, 1995, at 19. The tale of Isgro's money,
drugs, and the mob was told in the 1991 novel Hit Men, a book about the world of independent
promotion and the exceptional power they exerted over the record companies in the 1980s.
FREDRIC DANNEN, HIT MEN (Vintage Books 1991) (1990).
122. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 538. Record labels and independent
promoters similarly adapted to the threat of RICO statutes by altering the terms of the parties'
contractual relationship:
During the mid-1980s, a record company would retain independent promoters
under contracts with incomplete and unspecified terms that reflected the record
company's need to minimize its knowledge of the promoter's activities.... The
record company also might avoid inquiring whether the independent promoter uses
payola in conducting his business, and particularly whether he intends to use payola
to promote the record for which the record company has retained him.... If the
record company failed to steer this course of precautionary ignorance and the
independent promoter in fact dispensed payola, the record company might be
deemed to have willfully caused the independent promoter to have committed an
act of payola.
Id. at 538-39.
123. Id. at 529 (citing Complaint at 6-7, Isgro v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., No. 86-
2740 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 1986)).
124. Despite their questionable existence, indies also serve as efficient lobbyists for band
managers. As one band manager put it:
Without independent promoters, you would have everyone calling the radio stations
to try to get a song added. I would call, the record label would call, even the artist
may call. No radio station wants to hear from all of us... indies allow the rest of
us to get on with our jobs.
Telephone Interview with Anonymous, Band Manager (Sept. 21, 2001) (name withheld upon
request of interviewee).
125. Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 529.
126. Eric Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, SALON.COM (June 5, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/feature/2001/06/05/sony_payola/print.html [hereinafter Boehlert, The
"Bootylicious" Gambit] (describing that in the 1980s companies may have spent $12 million a
year on independent promotion, whereas in 2001, some companies "spend that much every few
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questioning whether indies are still worth their weight in gold.
127
To secure airtime for their client's artists, indies form strategic
alliances with a station's general manager or program director, typically by
guaranteeing the station a lump sum of money termed "promotional
support.' ' 128  The lump sum guarantee of approximately $100,000 per
annum places the indie as the exclusive point man at that given station.
129
The promotional budget supplied by the indie, supposedly used by the
radio station to buy T-shirts, billboard ads, and station vans, is in reality
spent by the station in any manner that it sees fit. 130 Radio stations are able
to accept the money or other consideration 131 from the indies as
promotional support because it is not tied directly to the purchase of airtime
for any particular song. 32 Rather, the money or consideration supplied by
the indie serves primarily to have a song added to the station's playlist
33
An "add" in industry parlance signifies that a station has put one of the
songs into the station's rotation. 134  Once the song is added, it is
theoretically in the hands of the station's programmers to decide how many
radio spins the song receives.135 , While indies do not generally dictate the
months").
127. Id. (explaining that some record labels may begin to question continued indie payment
in certain markets). "Concerned about the pervasive and costly pay-for-play independent-
promotion system that has become entrenched at commercial radio, some are wondering if it's
time for federal regulators, in effect, to save the industry from itself." Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-
Play, supra note 25.
128. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25. Although indies typically provide
"annual promotion budgets to pop and rock stations," it is reported that indies in the urban-music
genre actually "make direct cash payments to radio programmers to play specific songs." Philips,
Radio Exec 's Claims, supra note 105.
129. Michael Roberts, Playola: Most Radio Stations Pick Songs That Are Good for
Everyone but Aspiring Musicians and Listeners, DENVER WESTWORD (Oct. 18, 2001), at
http://www.westword.com/issues/2001-10-18/message.htmll/index.html [hereinafter Roberts,
Playola].
130. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
131. What is exchanging hands is not always actual dollar bills. For instance, in the old
days of payola scandals, the most common methods used to gain influence with radio
programmers were the provision of prostitutes and drugs. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 198.
Today, it is common for independent promoters to appease the station owners with other
kickbacks such as gift certificates, cars, and exotic trips. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra
note 25. "Sources say American Express gift certificates have become the currency of choice
among stations looking for something in exchange for playlist adds." Id.
132. Jeff Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them out, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2001, at C I [hereinafter Leeds, Small Record Labels].
133. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
134. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
135. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
Everyone says indies don't force stations to add records. That's
ridiculous... [b]ecause [if there is friction] the indie will get on the phone with the
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exact number of spins that a song receives,' 36 those that possess significant
industry pull can typically generate enough incentive for the station to push
a particular single.
37
Indies themselves are by no means victims of record company
exploitation. Although the indie must produce the "perks" to entice the
radio station into adding a song to a playlist, 138 once successful, they reap
very lucrative benefits from the record labels themselves. 139 The services
that an independent promoter provides are not inexpensive.140 Every time a
reporting FM radio station adds a new song to their playlist, the indie who
pushes the song receives a paycheck from the record label to recoup the
expenses paid to the radio stations, while keeping a large portion for
himself. 141 The average market rate for an addition to a playlist is typically
station [general manager] and say, "Look, your [program director] has not been
cooperative over the last few months on adds I need." The G.M. either says to the
indie, "Our relationship is about access, not influence," or he caves. Most G.M.s
cave and have a word with the P.D.: "Look, we have $100,000 a year riding on this
relationship with our indie." Then suddenly-bam-a song you know the P.D.
hates shows up on the air.
Id.
136. Id. "Today, indies pay stations for 'access,' not airplay. At least in theory." Id.
Money provided to the indies "doesn't guarantee any sort of success, just that the single will have
access to the airwaves. If the song catches on and eventually crosses over to the mainstream Top
40 format, indie costs balloon to more than $1 million." Boehlert, Save Us from Ourselves, supra
note 1.
137. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7. Furthermore, independent promoters can
influence radio station programming decisions without triggering disclosure requirements through
the use of other enticements such as gift certificates or expensive dinners. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text. This is because the FCC, in an administrative ruling, carved out a gaping
loophole in section 508 of the Communications Act when it held that, with respect to gifts given
by record promoters to radio station personnel, "social exchanges between friends are not
'payola."' In re Applications of Kaye-Smith Enters., 71 F.C.C.2d 1402, 1408 (1979). So long as
gifts between "friends" are not given with the specific quid pro quo of receipt of airtime, they are
a permissible way of influencing playlist decision-making. See id. As a result of these
ambiguities, record companies have successfully manipulated their use of independent promoters
in order to minimize their own exposure to criminal liability. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
138. Indies will typically guarantee a radio station $100,000 per annum to become the
exclusive point man at that given station. Roberts, Playola, supra note 129. The money that the
indies provide to the stations are used to "defray expenses for contest giveaways, vacation fly-
aways, concerts, conventions and other promotions." Chuck Philips, Logs Link Payments with
Radio Airplay, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Philips, Logs Link Payments].
Once the indie controls the station, they are systematically paid for the addition of any song to the
station's playlist. Id.
139. See Boehlert, Payfor Play, supra note 7.
140. Eric Boehlert, More Waves in the Radio Business, SALON.COM (Aug. 6, 2001), at
http://www.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/08/06/radiorecords/index.html.
141. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7 (explaining that indies will pass along
approximately sixty percent of the money to the stations owners and will keep the remaining
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$1,000 in large markets such as Los Angeles or New York,142 but that price
can skyrocket to upwards of $8,000 if the record label is desperate enough
to get the song placed in the station's rotation. 43 The indies keep detailed
"banks"' 44 of which radio stations have added a particular song and invoice
accordingly. 45 To launch a single at rock radio stations over several weeks
can cost a record label upwards of $250,000 in indie fees. 146 The annual
industry price tag for employing indies to carry out such "promotional"
expenses is an estimated $100 million a year. 147 Despite these costs, record
companies are willing to front these exorbitant fees because both record
labels and artists recognize that "airplay is like oxygen-without it, you
die."' 48
1. You Made Your Bed, Now Lie in It'
49
The music industry may have successfully shifted the legal risk of
violating payola laws onto the independent promoters, but in doing so, they
may have become a slave of their own design.150  Today, most everyone
within the music industry recognizes that indies can make or break an
artist's career. 151 Because of long standing relationships with radio
amount for themselves). Even the indies that become the point men in smaller markets such as
Greenville, South Carolina, are likely to make a handsome living. "You could gross between half
a million and 1 million dollars each year. That's with no staff-just a couple of phones and a fax
machine." Id.
142. See Chuck Philips, U.S. Widens Probe into Bribery in Latin Radio, L.A. TtMEs, Nov.
3, 1999, at Al (comparing radio broadcast outlets in Los Angeles and New York with those of
smaller markets).
143. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
144. Philips, Logs Link Payments, supra note 138. "Like a bank account, there are debits
and credits, deposits and withdrawals." Id.
145. Id.
146. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
147. Leeds, Small Record Labels, supra note 132.
148. Adler, supra note 10, at 170. On very rare occasions, however, there may be some
songs that grab the attention of station programmers without the use of independent promotion.
While engaging in payola exchanges through the use of independent promoters may not be an
absolute prerequisite to a song receiving radio airplay, the possibility of getting a song on the air
entirely without independent promotion is slim. See John Nova Lomax, Streamlining the Hit-
Making Process, HOUsTON PRESS (Nov. 8, 2001), at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2001-
11-08/racket.html/l/index.html.
149. "They, who must accept the onus for having started the practice, are now moaning the
blues." SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at 80.
150. Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, supra note 126. "Of course, the labels, always
searching for a competitive edge, pay the fees willingly, and have only themselves to blame for
runaway costs. 'Indies are only in business through the benevolence and stupidity of record
companies,' says one indie who's benefited for years." Id.
151. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7. "Indies are not the guys U2 or Destiny's Child
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programmers and financial alliances with station managers, indies are paid
not only for what they can do to get a song on the air, but also out of fear of
what pull the indie may possess in keeping the single off the air.
152
Because the record labels need to ensure that the indie will be working with
them and not against them in promoting their lesser known artists,'53 labels
continue to pay for songs by popular artists that the station would likely
play even without the indie's efforts. 54  Even on those rare occasions
where the station programmer is the one to discover a song by a new artist
and adds the song based solely on its merit, the indie controlling that
station will be paid for the add. 55
Despite persistent problems, record labels cannot afford to relinquish
the influence vis-A-vis the indies that they ultimately have on a station's
playlist. Indies with considerable clout recognize that they are an
indispensable asset to the record companies and are able to capitalize on
the industry's vulnerabilities by charging whatever fee they see fit.
15 6
Legal recourse against an independent promoter that acts opportunistically
is virtually nonexistent as the use of the indie to skirt payola laws borders
on the edge of illegality.'57 According to one promotion veteran, "'If you
have to pay [an indie] $10,000 to shut your boss up, goddamn it, you pay,
let me tell you.""5 8 Thus, record companies have given birth to their own
prisoner's dilemma: either continue to pay whatever fees the indies demand
or eliminate their existence. As history dictates, the latter is not likely an
option.
Since payola's beginnings in the 1890s, movements to prohibit the
practice have been used as competitive weapons by industry insiders who
would encourage others not to engage in the practice, but would
nevertheless do so themselves.'59 The early 1980s marked the resurgence
thanked on Grammy night, but everyone in the business, artists included, understands that the
indies make or break careers." Id.
152. Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, supra note 126. "But the companies are also
afraid of the indies. They're reluctant to confront them for fear that they could retaliate by
sabotaging future hits." Id.
153. Id.; see also Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7 ("The fear is that if a label tangles
with the indie over billing, he could torpedo the labels' next project by bad-mouthing a new
single or keeping it off the air until his previous invoice is paid.").
154. Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, supra note 126.
155. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
156. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. SEGRAVE, supra note 14, at ix-x. "Music companies themselves have been ambivalent
about payola. They favor a strict ban since that might prevent new companies from entering the
industry. Once payola is banned, those then in the industry favor violating the ban since it would
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of discussions intended to limit or eliminate the use of independent
promoters. When Warner Communications, Inc. and CBS began talks of
dropping independent promoters, other record companies promised to do
the same, so long as Warner and CBS took the lead.1 60 However, after
Warner and CBS terminated the use of independent promoters, competitors
failed to follow suit. Instead, they used the opportunity to increase their
independent promotion expenditures, thereby gaining greater shares of
airplay. 16
1
The Warner-CBS boycott highlights the dangers of challenging
independent promoters. In early 1981, although songs from the Who and
Loverboy originally received overwhelming response, the singles from
both bands plummeted off the charts once the Warner-CBS independent
promotion ban went into effect.1 6' As Dick Asher, then president of CBS,
noted:
All of a sudden, it just came off the air. It's one thing to keep
something off the air to begin with; it's another thing to take
something that's obviously doing pretty well and just take it off
the air. Despite the fact that the stations might have been
playing it, the listeners might have been liking it, they actually
could reach back and pull it off.
63
The disastrous results of their termination of independent promoters in
1981 led Warner and CBS to resume the use of independent promoters
shortly thereafter, albeit at rates considerably higher than before. 164
The lessons learned by companies such as Warner and CBS in the
1980s are all the more apparent in the year 2002. The market for
independent promoters has skyrocketed with the increased enforcement of
private RICO causes of action and the consolidation of radio stations
through the Telecommunications Act of 1996.165 The only way to
successfully excommunicate indies would be by an across-the-board ban by
all record labels. Reality, however, dictates that no such consensus will
ever be reached, nor would such a boycott effectively stay in existence.
166
give them an advantage over competitors." Id.
160. DANNEN, supra note 121, at 209.
161. Id. at 214. "As Warner and CBS product got knocked off the air, the other labels
began to dominate Top 40 airplay as never before. Warner's sales dropped, and it suffered a
decline in U.S. market share." Id.
162. Id. at 210-12.
163. Id. at 211.
164. Id. at 213-15.
165. See discussion supra Parts II.C, III.A.
166. The mid-1980s marked more talk about the elimination of independent promoters.
Despite the talk, independent promoters were confident that no such ban would effectively take
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While it is unlikely that independent promoters will become extinct
under current payola laws, there are some promising indications that their
use is being scaled back. In May 2001, Columbia Records declared that it
would curb indie payments on behalf of the new single "Bootylicious"
from the girl group phenomenon Destiny's Child. 167  Albeit a minor
distinction, the label declared that it would pay the minimum $1,000 to
indies whose radio stations were in the large markets, but it would refuse to
pay indies for the adds in "smaller-market stations. ' 68  The result of
Columbia's risky endeavor was that two weeks after pop-sensation
Destiny's Child released the "Bootylicious" single, 113 pop stations added
the song to their playlists.169  However, the 113 stations playing the
"Bootylicious" single was a drop off from the 150 radio stations that were
playing Destiny's Child's prior single "Survivor" two weeks after that
song's release only a few months earlier. 170  It was speculated that
"Bootylicious" was kept off the air in markets where indies still maintain
exceptional influence as retaliation against Columbia's move to limit
independent promotion.
171
Despite Destiny's Child's popularity, Columbia's decision to limit the
use of indies in such a fashion is virtually unheard of.' 72 Some industry
insiders speculated that Columbia made this move to test the waters for a
challenge to the future of independent promoters.1 73  Although
"Bootylicious" did incredibly well on the radio, the drop off of nearly forty
stations adding the song to the station rotation is a sobering reminder of the
power that indies exercise over the industry. Furthermore, the somewhat
successful curtailment of indie promotion for artists as popular as Destiny's
Child do not reflect the likely outcome if other less popular artists fail to
pay indie fees. 174 It remains to be seen whether record labels that house
high-profile acts such as 'NSYNC or Britney Spears will also attempt to
place. One such indie stated, "It's hard to imagine the industry sticking together long enough to
walk away from us." Patrick Goldstein and Robert Hilburn, About-Face on Record Promotions,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1986, at CI. A Los Angeles-based record executive seconded the indies'
confidence in the future of independent promotion by commenting that he could not imagine the
industry doing without the services of independent promotion indefinitely, stating: "There will
clearly be independent promotion in the future." Id. As this Comment indicates, the predictions
of the 1980s seem to have proven correct.
167. Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, supra note 126.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Boehlert, The "Bootylicious" Gambit, supra note 126.
174. See id.
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limit independent promotion for their artists. It should be clear, however,
that the move will unlikely extend to lesser-known artists who must still
rely on the indies to get the attention of radio station executives.
1 75
2. What Does Independent Promotion Mean for Artists?
For radio stations and record companies, the use of indies seems to be
a win-win situation. Radio stations get paid big money by record
companies that in turn pass many of the costs onto the artists themselves
through recoupment provisions in artist contracts. 76 Dirk Lance of the
rock band Incubus exclaims:
[Record labels] go and they hire these people [indies] and they
never ask the band. So you get a bill, I saw a bill the other day.
I sold three million records but somehow I didn't make any
money because its $500,000 in independent promotion. Who
approved that? We didn't. Yet they want to try to charge it to
US. 177
Presumably, artists themselves would not mind paying independent
promotion fees in order to increase their exposure, and thus ultimately
increase their own profitability. Yet, this is not the way that Dirk Lance
views the utility of independent promotion:
Independent promotion is money that disappears from a band's
pocket that is charged to the band and no one knows where it
goes or what it actually does. There's an idea of what it is
supposed to do, but you don't know that. You don't know that
if I pay $5,000 to an independent promoter I'm going to see
5,000 spins on my record. You're going to pay somebody that
money and maybe something will happen and maybe it won't.
It's gambling. And it's gambling with somebody else's money.
Ultimately, it's gambling with my money. Independent
promotion doesn't really guarantee anything. It's payola, but
175. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 30.
176. Bill Holland, The Dirtiest Word in the Record Business, BILLBOARD, Oct. 6, 2001, at
90.
According to recording artists and representatives, the dirtiest 10-letter word in the
record business is "recoupment." In modem times, the recoupment provision in all
record contracts has payback conditions so onerous and unfair that in many cases,
the amount often can never be paid back unless albums achieve gold-or,
increasingly, platinum-level sales.
Id. "Who pays? The artist, for one. Most record companies recoup their costs for independent
promotion from the artist's CD royalties-which, of course, would be depleted by the lack of
airplay." Boehlert, Payola City, supra note 24.
177. Telephone Interview with Dirk Lance, Bass Player, Incubus (Oct. 6, 2001).
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with unclear results. It's a smoke and mirrors game.178
An ambiguity exists between those who proclaim that an artist has no
shot of breaking through without independent promotion and artists like
Dirk Lance who question its value. This seeming contradiction may be
explained with the recognition that not all artists are at the same stage of
their careers. Unknown artists introduced to the world of radio buy into the
hype that independent promotion is the only way to launch a career.
179
Indies, because they already have the attention of the radio stations'
programmers, ostensibly make good on their promises by getting the songs
of lesser known artists on a station's playlist. 80 Thus, the use of the indies,
while not promising a song's success, may be a necessary stepping stone in
any artist's career.1
8 1
However, it seems unfair to force popular artists who have a proven
history of success to pay independent promotion fees, when in all
likelihood their song will automatically be added to a playlist because of
listener demand. Ultimately, the successful artists are forced into
"subsidizing the payola system.' 82 Popular artists are effectively required
to continue to pay independent promotion fees in order to ensure that the
record labels will not alienate the indies from pushing songs of the label's
lesser-known artists.' 83 While record labels may absorb the independent
promotion costs of unsuccessful artists, the artists who actually produce
revenue for the record labels are the ones left holding the bag. 84 The fear
of indie retaliation has undoubtedly kept the record companies willing to
play the independent promotion game.185  However, their willingness to
continue to pay is no doubt softened by the fact that many of the costs can
178. Id.
179. See Leeds, Small Record Labels, supra note 132 (explaining that unknown artists have
little hope of receiving radio play without independent promotion expenditures).
180. Leeds, Middlemen, supra note 22 (explaining that a virtually unknown rock band
named Smackradio received more airplay than popular acts like Staind and Sum 41 at a
Monterey, California rock station after receiving help from one particular indie).
181. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7. "'The labels have created a monster,' agrees
longtime artist manager Ron Stone. Nevertheless, Stone views indies as an important insurance
policy for his clients. 'I never want to find out after the fact that we should've hired this indie or
that indie. I want to cover all the bases."' Id.
182. Lomax, supra note 148.
183. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
184. See Boehlert, Payola City, supra note 24. "The result is a brazenly money-driven
system that revolves around chronic payoffs; it actually costs artists earnings .... I Id.; see also
Telephone Interview with Dirk Lance, supra note 177 (discussing the invoicing of independent
promotion expenses to artists).
185. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
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be shifted to the artists themselves.
8 6
B. Other Industry Practices Challenging the Laws
Payola laws, written in 1960 to prohibit payments made to individual
radio station disc jockeys, do not adequately reflect the current pay-for-play
landscape. 187 The laws' inability to adequately adapt to the changing face
of the music industry is illustrated not only by the emergence of
independent promoters, but also in the form of "reverse payola" in which
radio stations are the parties now exploiting the laws' deficiencies.'
88
Despite the existence of source disclosure laws,' 89 record companies and
radio stations continue to push the limits by devising new strategies
involving undisclosed payment for broadcast. 90  Perhaps the most
influential, and potentially dangerous, promotional tool utilized by radio
stations is that of the free concert. 191
The payment of money from record labels is not the only factor in
determining radio programming. 192  There may be numerous concerns
when a radio station agrees to increase airplay in exchange for an artists'
free concert appearance. 193 The payola implications are illustrated through
a familiar hypothetical scenario. KROC, a large Los Angeles modem rock
radio station, plans to rent a venue and put on a showcase of the country's
largest rock acts. To ensure the show's success, the station builds up hype
for the artists playing at the event, therefore increasing airplay for any artist
186. Lomax, supra note 148.
In simple terms, record labels will pay for an artist to record an album and promote
it. For these services, labels expect to reap 90 percent of the [sic] what profits
occur, if any. They leave t0 percent to the artist, which seems miserly on its own.
But it gets much worse. Out of that tenth, the label expects to recoup its production
and promotion costs. What is left over after that the artist is welcome to.
Id.
187. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25 (explaining that the payola laws are
both out of date and irrelevant to today's marketplace).
The FCC is obviously ill-equipped to deal with this new form of payola. It's no
longer about some deejay in the control room stuffing a few bucks into his back
pocket. These days payola is being done right out in the open by huge
conglomerates. And nobody in Washington seems to care.
Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78 (quoting Jeff Cohen, founder of Fairness and Accuracy in
Reporting, a New York-based media watchdog group).
188. Brock, supra note 99, at 750 (defining "reverse payola"); see also Radio Pushes Bands
for Freebies, supra note 23.
189. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999).
190. See Radio Pushes Bands for Freebies, supra note 23.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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who signs on. KROC secures an up and coming band named Audiovent to
play at the show. Even if KROC is unwilling to pay the same fees that the
band would command for a similar performance, Audiovent accepts the
invitation realizing that they will not get the push on their new album that
they hope to secure. Should Audiovent be unwilling or unable to comply,
at the very minimum, they will not receive the increased airtime exposure
that they would have received if they were to play the show. This deal
between the artist/record label and the radio station begs two ultimate
questions. First, does this unwritten agreement border on extortion?
Second, is this exchange sufficiently prohibited under the section 317 or
§ 73.1212 disclosure requirements?
The potential for radio station abuse when demanding artist
compliance or denying critical airtime is rather chilling. When an artist
such as Audiovent, who may be unwilling to rearrange an entire tour
schedule to accommodate KROC's request, 194 refuses to play at the
scheduled event, they do so at their peril. 195 Stations often refuse to air a
band's latest release unless they commit to the free concert, or the station
may threaten to ban all of a record label's upcoming releases if the label is
unable to persuade the band to perform. 196  Furthermore, "[h]uge radio
chains can demand-and obtain-exclusive rights to sponsor local
concerts, as well as extract other privileges (such as exclusive in-studio
interviews and appearances)."'' 97 A recent antitrust suit filed against Clear
Channel alleges that "[a]rtists or bands are coerced into signing up with
Clear Channel via an assortment of heavy-handed tactics, including the
'nationwide practice of threatening to deny and in fact denying critical
194. Neil Strauss, Pay-for-Play Back on the Air but This Rendition Is Legal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1998, at Al.
I'll be looking at a Limp Bizkit tour and the itinerary will say "Boston, Hartford,
New York," and I'll get a call that says we have to play this radio-station show on
the West Coast. So we have to cancel Boston, fly the band out and at the end of the
day it ends up costing $20,000 to $25,000.
Id. (quoting Jeff Kwatinetz, whose company manages Limp Bizkit).
195. Radio Pushes Bands for Freebies, supra note 23. "Artist managers contend that the
stations coerce bands by refusing to air their latest releases unless they commit to perform in
concert. Many artists now view it as little more than a shakedown that is broadly undermining the
live concert business." Id.
196. Id. Some argue that the fact that artists in turn receive increased air exposure for
agreeing to play at a free concert legitimizes this practice. See Sponsorship Identification, supra
note 67, at 2407 (explaining that the artist also receives a benefit from playing at these "record
hops"). While this may help a new artist gain exposure, "[t]he problem is that the bigger you get,
everybody wants an exclusive, and some stations get really mad and penalize you for performing
at a competing station's show by refusing to air your record at all." Radio Pushes Bands for
Freebies, supra note 23 (quoting Michael Lippman, manager of Matchbox 20).
197. Brock, supra note 99, at 749.
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airplay and other on-air promotional support."", 198 Termed by some as the
"new payola," 199 such practices could have devastating effects on both
artists and record labels.2z 0
Aside from decisions that keep band managers and artists up at night
wondering which path to travel, the question remains whether section 317
or § 73.1212 actually require disclosure of such transactions and
furthermore, whether the laws sufficiently protect artists against such
exploitation. In the past, the FCC scrutinized "record hops," which include
free performances, when they appear to be an inducement to broadcast z. 0
However, the context of this enforcement has always been a one-sided
transaction whereby the disclosure requirements have been in place to
ensure that record labels do not unduly entice radio stations into
programming decisions.2 02 Thus, while under section 317 a radio station is
still required to disclose that song play is in exchange for a concert
appearance, 0 3 the statute does not prohibit radio stations from pulling or
denying artist airtime as a bargaining tool in securing the concert
performance. 20 4 By failing to include language broad enough to encompass
prohibition of radio station extortion, the FCC's sponsorship disclosure
language leaves open the question as to whether these inducements are
198. Taking on the Empire, supra note 95.
199. Telephone Interview with Dirk Lance, supra note 177; Clear Channel Fined, supra
note 78 (explaining that the guaranteed "airplay of artists' songs in exchange for free appearances
at radio station concerts" is the "new form of payola").
200. See Taking on the Empire, supra note 95.
Many of our artists make their money on live performances, not CD sales. So they
have to fly to the city where the festival is, which may make them lose money on a
date they could have been headlining, and then they have to fly back, which may
make them lose another date-and on top of that, they may lose a date they would
have normally played in that city, and that would have made them a lot more
income, because they've already played there on the tour. That's why artists hate
them [free concerts].
Id. (quoting Frank Riley of High Road, a California talent agency).
201. See Sponsorship Identification, supra note 67, at 2407.
202. See id.
203. Clear Channel Fined, supra note 78; 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994).
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (containing no language that indicates that radio station extortion
is prohibited). For instance, the language in the FCC's sponsorship identification guidelines,
while requiring disclosure if the "record hop" induces airplay, does not sufficiently cover
enticements made by radio stations to record companies. See Sponsorship Identification, supra
note 67, at 2407. The statutory language makes it clear that what is actually being regulated are
those instances where the artist offers themselves up to increase radio airplay and does not
contemplate radio station extortion of artists. Id. "[W]here a disc jockey or station licensee
anticipates a financial benefit to be derived from participation in a 'record hop' and "[less
direct, but just as financially advantageous are the benefits to performers, distributors and record
manufacturers from air exposure in return for their contributions to the 'record hop."' Id.
(emphasis added).
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covered.
Assuming arguendo that the disclosure requirements of section 317
and § 73.1212 apply in the free concert scenario, the problem remains that
such enticements may be difficult to prove. Furthermore, disclosure will
not adequately protect the listener or artist. Artists often agree to play at
free concerts not because the radio station has explicitly demanded it, but
rather, due to the unspoken rule that their precious airtime will be
decreased should they fail to do S0.205 Furthermore, even if a radio station
were to announce they were airing a song based on an artist's agreement to
play the concert, this does nothing to protect the artist against extortion, nor
does it impart any beneficial information to the listener. Imagine a radio
station announcement that communicates the following disclosure: "We
here at KROC are only playing Audiovent's new song because they have
agreed to play at our concert next month." The only fact the radio station
would be disclosing is what the listener intuitively already knows-KROC
wants to spark interest in Audiovent's new song in hopes that the listener
will want to attend the radio station's sponsored show.206 Radio stations'
denial of airplay to an artist that fails to play at a free concert is a credible
and precarious threat. However, the solution is not found within the weak
disclosure requirements of section 317 or § 73.1212.207
205. Bill Holland & Ray Waddell, Artists Seek Govt. Redress of Contract, Radio Issues:
Congressman Seeks Clear Channel Probes, BILLBOARD, Feb. 2, 2002, at 3. Congressman
Berman's spokesperson has declared that "they were not free to name 'the several' constituent
recording artists who had approached the lawmaker about the problem, 'because they fear
retaliation."' Id. at 96. Similarly, others in the industry refuse to challenge companies such as
Clear Channel who may be adversely affecting business:
Other promoters, record executives, and agents complain about the company's
tactics, but so far they've all refused to put their name-and their business-on the
line. "People are reluctant to talk because Clear Channel is so
powerful .... Whether you love them or hate them, you still have to work with
them."
Adler, supra note 10. It may be even more difficult for artists, who are directly and significantly
impacted by independent promotions to get involved in such a debate: "'They [the labels] created
the fucking problem, now you want us to put a target on our backs? Fuck it ... The fear... is
that musicians who complain about indie promotion will be kept off the radio. Without
commercial airplay it's virtually impossible to sustain a career."' Boehlert, Save Us from
Ourselves, supra note 1.
206. The legislative history of section 317 acknowledges just how prevalent and accepted
this practice is:
It also appears that recordings by performers appearing at the "hop".. . may have
been played at frequent intervals preceding the "hop" as a means of engendering in
the listener a desire to purchase an admission ticket to the "hop" or in exchange for
the cooperation of performers or donors of records.
H.R. REP. No. 86-1800, at 38 (1960).
207. Possible remedies for this unfortunate situation are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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IV. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
Cloaked in an image of bribery and corruption, there is little wonder
why the concept of pay-for-play continues to draw attack.2 °8 However, by
predefining the issue as such, critics fail to recognize that payola itself (not
the landscape created through independent promotion) may be a legitimate
tool in an industry where finite airtime requires that purely economic
decisions be made. Despite the apparent deficiencies in sections 317 and
508, the proper remedy does not lie in all-out deregulation, nor does it lie in
total payola prohibition. Rather, an open-market system that would allow
payment by record companies directly to radio stations while still limiting
the amount of airtime that can be purchased would help to minimize or
entirely eliminate much of payola's unintended negative consequences.
Such a system would secure record companies the opportunity to have their
artists' singles played for a very limited amount of spins to spark
interest,2°9 yet the song's future airplay would be based primarily on
listener response.10
The overall effect of this partial deregulation would increase market
efficiency by returning independent promoters to their proper informational
role,21' thereby encouraging the dissemination of more accurate and
valuable information to record labels and radio stations.212 The exorbitant
fees paid to independent promoters would, therefore, be replaced with less
208. Payola's negative image remains as true today as it did when Congress first regulated
its practice in 1960. Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25. For instance, in 2001,
Senator John McCain urged Congress to investigate the pay-for-play system, arguing, "The radio
market is now clearly driven by greed and corruption rather than creativity and talent." Id.
209. There is strong evidence that even this initial trial period can generate a strong listener
response. Strauss, supra note 194. For instance, in January of 1998, Flip/Interscope Records
agreed to pay a Portland, Oregon radio station approximately $5,000 to play a song by then-
emerging rock act Limp Bizkit fifty times during five weeks. Id. The labels' decision to take a
risk fronting the pay-for-play money has since paid off-Limp Bizkit is now one of the biggest
rock acts in the country. See Eric Boehlert, Napster Will Sponsor Free Summer Tour for Limp
Bizkit, SALON.COM (April 24, 2000), at http://www.salon.com/ent/log/2000/04/24/bizkitnapster/
index.html [hereinafter Boehlert, Limp Bizkit] (noting that at that time Limp Bizkit's current
album was certified platinum six times).
210. A radio station may gauge listener response by reference to the number of listener call-
ins and emails requesting a single or the number of albums an artist sells in the week following
the secured airtime. See Deborah Evans Price, Higher Ground, BILLBOARD, Nov. 18, 2000, at 44
(giving examples of ways radio stations can determine which songs to play). There are likely
both formal and informal ways for the station to determine whether airplay should continue.
211. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
212. J. Gregory Sidak and David E. Kronemyer proposed a similar solution to the payola
problem in 1987. Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 566-71. However, rather than
proposing partial deregulation, Sidak and Kronemyer argued for the total deregulation of the
"market for the on-the-air advertising of pop music." Id. at 567.
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speculative forms of artist promotion. Artists could now gain exposure
without being forced to bear the excessive costs of independent promotion.
However, to implement a workable solution to a seemingly boundless
problem, one must dismiss all preconceived prejudices and recognize what
benefits payola, in its purest form, can provide.
A. The Debate: What Will Pay-for-Play Do for the Future of "Good"
Music?
Critics of payola contend that the practice of payment for broadcast
results in mediocre radio--with radio stations airing songs not based on
research, sales, and requests, but with airtime going to the highest bidder.213
The fear is that songs unworthy of radio attention will get play simply
because the record label is willing to pay.214 In effect, radio stations could
extort money from record labels just to have radio stations do their jobs by
playing music. 21 5 Pay-for-play would transform music into an infomercial,
where each paid and disclosed song is akin to a commercial exchange.21 6
Furthermore, small record companies, unable to pay the quickly escalating
costs of independent promotion, may be driven into extinction.217  Thus,
pay-for-play threatens the notion that only deserving songs are played on
the radio, while also threatening the survival of those dedicated to making
the music.218
The above arguments, while sound in theory, may fail to fully take
into account the most basic of economic theories-that smart business
transactions are almost always predicated on the law of supply and
demand. Record labels supply money to radio stations through
intermediary independent promoters based on the expectation that the paid
influence will ultimately further the sale and popularity of the artist's
album. 21 9 For payment to continue, the radio station must produce; that is,
it must attract a steady stream of listeners to make it economically wise for
213. See Chuck Taylor, Paid Play Changing Biz Landscape: Rise of Direct Label/Radio
Pacts Sparks Wide-ranging Debate, BILLBOARD, May 9, 1998, at 1, 1.
214. See id.
215. See id.; see also Strauss, supra note 194.
216. Strauss, supra note 194.
217. Leeds, Small Record Labels, supra note 132.
218. Id. (explaining that small independent record labels get locked out of radio without the
ability to pay the indies). Failure to obtain radio airplay will likely drive smaller record labels to
extinction. See id.
219. Strauss, supra note 194. In 1998, Limp Bizkit's label formally agreed to pay $5,000
for the airing of the band's songs fifty times within five weeks. Id. The label's move to purchase
the airtime skyrocketed Limp Bizkit to one of the most popular hard rock acts in the country. See
Boehlert, Limp Bizkit, supra note 209; Taylor, supra note 213, at 82-83.
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the record company to continue to pay the fee.2 20 Radio stations that fail to
play "good" music run the risk of alienating listeners, which in turn will
deter record labels from securing airtime at that particular station. 1
Should listenership decline, the radio station will be saddled not only with
the loss of promotional dollars from the record labels themselves, but also
with the loss of all traditional commercial advertising revenue.222 Radio
stations that accept payola have an incentive not to broadcast certain
material if doing so would cause a larger marginal loss in advertising
revenue than the station would receive in marginal payola revenue.2 3
Therefore, prudent business judgment demands that all involved produce
and distribute music of a caliber that will satisfy its listeners.
The theory that undeserving songs will be played similarly may fail
because it does not reflect the screening process at the front end of music
decision-making. The reality of the music business is that record labels
spend exorbitant amounts of money on artists who may never produce a
single hit.224 A record label is unlikely to make expenditures in the form of
signing fees and production costs if they are unconvinced that the artist has
a remote possibility of becoming a star.2 5 The record label cannot recoup
their initial investment if the artist fails to sell records.2 26 The process of
screening undeserving music does not begin when the songs are recorded
and sent to the radio station, but rather, from the moment an artist is
signed.227
220. See Joe Gardyasz, Station Changes Format; Manager Hopes Classic Rock Music Will
Attract Broader Audience, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, Oct. 26, 1997, at IF, LEXIS, News, News
Group File, All (explaining that "[a]ttracting additional listeners is the name of the game in the
radio business, because more listeners help stations bring in more advertising dollars").
221. Id.; see also Coase, supra note 18, at 308.
222. See Coase, supra note 18, at 308. For instance, the Arbitron Ratings Company
periodically estimates audience shares for radio stations within a geographic area. Gardyasz,
supra note 220. National and regional advertisers rely heavily on a station's Arbitron rating in
determining on which stations to advertise. Id. "The Arbitron ratings are like a report card for
radio stations. Stations use the ratings to measure their success against one another and to set
advertising rates." Jamie Kritzer, Hip-Hop Station Still No. 1 in Triad, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, NC), Nov. 8, 2001, at 9, LEXIS, News, News Group File, All.
223. Coase, supra note 18, at 308.
224. See Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement: Does It Empower or Enslave?, 3
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40,42 (2001).
225. See Boehlert, Payola City, supra note 24 (explaining that record labels recover many of
their costs by recoupment of CD sales). If an artist fails to sell CDs, then labels will be unable to
recover these costs. Id.
226. See Morrow, supra note 224, at 43-44, 49; see also Boehlert, Payola City, supra note
24.
227. Morrow, supra note 224, at 43. This argument is not to suggest that only signed artists
have talent, nor is it to suggest that those artists signed are necessarily the most talented-a little
luck in the music industry may take an artist farther than a little talent. As a general proposition,
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Additionally, direct pay-for-play would provide small independent
record labels with the ability to compete with powerhouse record labels that
currently dominate the independent promotion market. 28  Because
independent labels frequently lack the capital needed to participate in
promotional pay-for-play gimmicks such as free concerts, trips, and
giveaways, direct pay-for-play guarantees a return on the label's
investment.229 Many independent labels favor such a move, arguing:
If I had the opportunity to bet on my song, right now I've got to
put money on the table, and it may or may not get
played... [but] [i]f I had an opportunity to actually put the
money on the table and let it get out there and let the consumer
decide, to me that's more attractive than allowing the system to
decide.23
By removing the speculation that comes with gambling with the indies,
record labels could now provide the listening public with new and fresh
music often shunned in favor of proven standards.231
B. A Proposed Treatment for a Seemingly Unending Problem
One of the pillars of the American free enterprise system is the ability
to promote and sell products in any fashion.232 Because of this foundation,
companies regularly secure airtime in the form of commercials on both
television and radio airwaves. From this, product placements in motion
pictures now allow a company to place its product in prominent view,
while slotting fees paid to supermarkets by manufacturers to place new
products in prominent positions on the shelves has also become the rule
rather than the exception. 233 In 1994, The Box, an all-request music-video
however, it is fair to assume that those artists who have captured the attention of radio executives
have been signed to a record label for a reason.
228. Taylor, supra note 213, at 82. Currently, five major record labels control the
independent promotion market. Boehlert, Save Us from Ourselves, supra note 1.
229. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
230. Pay-for-Play Sparks Debate of Where Labels' Money Goes, BILLBOARD, May 9, 1998,
at 82-83 [hereinafter Pay-for-Play Sparks Debate].
231. See Strauss, supra note 194.
232. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford University Press 1976). The
principle of economic liberalism and non-interventionist laissez-faire capitalism advanced by
Adam Smith has laid the foundation of the American free enterprise system. See Michael Skube,
Books: Reviews and Opinion; Cultural Meanings in Wealth, Poverty, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Apr. 19, 1998, at L10.
233. Bob Greene, Payola, Part 2-Will Anyone Even Notice?, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 2001, at
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channel, began a campaign entitled "Playola," where record companies
could pay $27,000 to have their wannabe hits played for a total of forty-two
times during two weeks.234 Even airlines have joined in the realm of pay-
for-play by allowing record labels to purchase in-flight video time to run
the music videos of contemporary music artists.235 The concept of
promotion, however, does not yet fully extend to cover the payment of
money in exchange for securing radio airtime of a particular song.23 6 Given
the movement to allow companies to secure product prominence through
untraditional forms of advertising, there is little justification for the failure
to partly extend this rationale to the concept of pay-for-play on the radio.237
Failure to classify the purchasing of airtime for songs as with any
other form of promotion leads to the illogical assumption that a song has a
value to a record label other than as a promotional tool. Securing airtime
for a particular song furthers the record label's legitimate goal of selling its
238ultimate product-either the album or the artists themselves. In a sense,
234. Strauss, supra note 194. The Box Music Network has since been folded into the
MTV2 music video channel. Benny Evangelista, Former MTV Executive Named MusicNet's
CEO, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 2001, at B3.
235. Jeffrey Jolson-Colburn, Record Companies Find Skies Friendly to Music Videos,
HOLLYWOOD RPTR., Dec. 30, 1991, at 1.
Record labels pay for the airtime as part of their marketing of a record or a
longform video to the captive audience. Cost depends on how many fliers a video
will reach during the month. For instance, United costs about $9,000 per month,
mid-sized Continental runs about $4,000 and smaller America West costs about
$2,000 per month. Elektra bought airtime on seven different airlines for a sky-high
blitz of the Natalie Cole video, "The Christmas Song."
Id.
236. This is evident due to the current status of payola laws. See discussion supra Part
II.A-B.
237. Americans may not be as hostile to the deregulation of payola as previously believed.
See Greene, supra note 233. One commentator notes that regardless of what current
investigations into the payola scandal discover, "Americans will yawn." Id.
Any time you go to the movies and see a brand-name product-a soft drink, a
candy bar, a luxury car-being used by one of the stars, you figure that a payment
has been made. That particular soft drink didn't just magically appear on screen;
that particular candy bar didn't just happen to be one that the director picked up in a
vending machine. Business was done-and the audience knows it, and has been
conditioned to accept it.
Id.
238. Artists driven by their love of music and not money would undoubtedly be
unappreciative of being considered a "product" of their record label. However, while a fondness
for the artist may develop, record labels arguably exist on pure economic decision-making, not on
warm, fuzzy feelings. The real threat in labeling an artist's work as a "product" is that it seems to
denigrate the countless hours of work that musicians dedicate to their craft. The purpose here,
however, is not to question the musical integrity of artists when recording and performing their
music. Rather, the reality of the business is that once the music has been effectively recorded, it
will likely need to be promoted to reach the largest segment of the listening public. To some, this
may be considered "selling-out." Perhaps those that label it as such fail to recognize that good
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the song is nothing more than a commercial.239 It acts to spark interest in
the artist's album, merchandise, or live performance. Although listeners
might derive a sense of enjoyment from a song that is often lacking with
other forms of commercial advertising, the motivation is the same-sell,
sell, sell. To sell the public on their ultimate "product," record labels may
have effectively cornered the market on the catchiest form of commercials
available.24°
Despite the fact that a song may technically be treated as a form of a
commercial, there are clear dangers in allowing a record label to have
unfettered authority to purchase airtime. Although record labels should be
allowed to directly pay radio stations for airtime, without specified limits
on the amount of airtime a label could purchase, the result would be that
the label, not the listener, would dictate what song could reach the number
one position on the charts.241  The desire to secure their artists that number
one slot would result in a bidding war between record companies whose
only interest is to have an artist's radio popularity translate into record
sales.242 The danger of such a proposition is that record labels would likely
turn around and charge the fees to the artist, ultimately decreasing artist
profitability.243 Artists, many of whom are still breaking into the industry,
music, without proper promotion and packaging, only takes an artist so far. While "selling-out"
seems to require that musical fads and statistics sway an artist in the recording process, it speaks
nothing of the process of promotion required for the public to become aware of a musical
masterpiece.
239. Strauss, supra note 194 (explaining that the practice of payola is akin to a television
"infomercial").
240. This is not to suggest that a record label should be given unfettered authority to
purchase airtime. Rather, this sets up the argument that direct payment, under certain guidelines,
could be allowed and regulated.
241. Strauss, supra note 194 (explaining that detractors "fear the practice makes it too easy
to tamper with the Billboard radio and singles charts, which do not differentiate between songs in
regular programming that have been paid for and ones that haven't"). This is the concern of
Incubus bassist Dirk Lance who notes that allowing record companies to dictate and define what
is popular on the radio "misses the point of what radio is about." Telephone Interview with Dirk
Lance, supra note 177.
242. Morrow, supra note 224, at 41 (explaining that "the sole purpose of a record company
is to sell records").
243. For mainstream popular acts such as Britney Spears that generate more income than
most Third World countries, one can hardly see justice done by increasing their profitability. See
Nicholas Stein, The 40 Richest Under 40: Celebrity Inc., FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 2001, at 164, 165,
190 (At age nineteen, singer Britney Spears was worth an estimated $46 million dollars.).
However, most artists will never get close to reaching the monetary status of a Britney Spears.
Recently, there have been a number of movements by artists to equalize what is seen as the one-
sidedness of the music industry. See Kathleen Sharp, Recording Artists Sue, Aiming to Rock
Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2001, at A6 (discussing how grunge rocker Courtney Love
leads the way in suits filed against record labels over one-sided and unfair terms of artists'
recording contracts). Record companies ofiten get rich off of artists who do not see the same size
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would ultimately pay to have their songs placed on the radio. Only this
time, if they do not pay the station's price, the chances of receiving airplay
would be effectively reduced from slim to none.244 One possible solution
would be to allow artists, through contract, to require the record label to
bear the costs of secured radio time. This, however, presupposes an artist
will be in a position to make such a demand. Because most recording
contracts are granted on a take it or leave it basis, 245 most artists will be
unable to pass these costs onto the record labels.
246
Regardless of whether the artist is the party substantially impacted by
direct pay-for-play, many of payola's other consequences will be amplified
rather than eradicated by total deregulation. If a record company could,
without limit, directly purchase airtime for a particular song, the radio
station would have little incentive to ensure the quality of the
programming.247 Although stations receive considerable perks from indies
to push certain songs, most of their profit stems from traditional
commercial advertising revenue.248 If all airtime was up for bid, stations
could successfully turn a profit without the need to appease their source of
commercial revenue. The need to satisfy the listening public would also
suffer because the listener would likely have little choice other than tuning
into a station that accepts payment for broadcast. 249  The enormous
incentive for stations to turn to a pay-for-play system would expectedly
eliminate the desire to operate in any other fashion.25 °
returns. See Lomax, supra note 148. Thus, while it is hard to feel sorry for people making a
living by playing music, fairness nevertheless dictates that they be the ones to see the rewards.
244. Despite evidence to the contrary, some argue that deserving songs will get played with
or without independent promotion. "'All record labels have the same chance at getting their
record played, as long as the program director is passionate about the record.... It doesn't take
one promotional dollar to get that record on the radio."' Leeds, Small Record Labels, supra note
132 (quoting Jeff Deane, general manager of a California-based indie firm). Although the
number of stations airing songs based strictly on the appeal of the music is undoubtedly
dwindling, some smaller individualized stations remain committed to playing songs solely on
perceived merit. Roberts, Playola, supra note 129.
245. See generally Morrow, supra note 224 (explaining how recording contracts often
enslave recording artists, many of whom do not hold the power to dictate their own terms).
246. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
247. See Strauss, supra note 194.
248. See Gardyasz, supra notes 220, 222 and accompanying text.
249. See Boehlert, Payola City, supra note 24.
250. This applies only to radio formats such as Top 40, rock, urban, and country that
currently use payola as a means of affecting broadcast decision-making. Boehlert, Payola City,
supra note 24; see discussion supra Part It. This likely would not apply to other formats such as
talk radio, smooth jazz, or oldies where, because there is little or no pressure to sell records,
payola is not an issue.
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Because total deregulation of payola would effectively eliminate the
need for traditional radio broadcast advertising, it is a near guarantee that
the advertising industry would vehemently oppose such a move. In
essence, advertisers would be forced to relinquish the medium of radio as a
forum for advertisement, unless the advertisers would be willing to pay
similar or higher rates to secure radio airtime. In effect, the result of total
deregulation would engage both record labels and advertisers in a bidding
war to secure advertising airtime. Moreover, massive radio deregulation in
1996 has already significantly impacted the way radio advertisers are
forced to do business. In fact, advertisers report that huge radio
conglomerate mega-chains "increasingly coerce them to buy advertising
time on weaker stations as a prerequisite for purchasing advertising time on
the chains' stronger stations in other, more desirable locales and
regions.,, 2 1  Already suffering from radio deregulation, total payola
deregulation would only aggravate advertisers' problems by effectively
pitting the advertising industry against the music industry-a debate
Congress or the FCC is unlikely to foster.
Some may argue that the simplest solution to the payola problem lies
neither in the current disclosure laws nor in partial deregulation, but rather,
in total prohibition of payment for broadcast.252 A total ban on pay-for-
play, however, fails to eliminate the pressures of the music industry that
spawn payola in the first place.253 Instead, it exacerbates the situation by
effectively denying record labels any influence on station programming.
Because record sales are crucial to a record label's bottom line,254 the labels
will likely adapt by finding new and potentially more damaging ways
around the prohibition. Rather than eliminating pay-for-play, total
prohibition would drive the current payola practice even further
underground, thereby impeding any hope for a more honest and efficient
music community.
Moreover, although the issue has never been explicitly addressed, a
total ban on pay-for-play may be unconstitutional as a content-based
regulation on speech. While a song may technically act as a commercial, it
is nevertheless artistic speech presumptively protected by the First
251. Brock, supra note 99, at 748.
252. See Strauss, supra note 194. "Detractors say the potential for misuse of pay-for-play is
great. They argue that stations could extort record companies for money to put their new bands
on the air." Id.
253. See discussion supra Part III.
254. Morrow, supra note 224, at 41 (explaining that "the sole purpose of a record company
is to sell records").
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Amendment.255 Under the current regulatory system, record labels do have
the option to purchase standard blocks of airtime typically allocated to
traditional commercial advertisements.256 Record labels rarely purchase
standard blocks of commercial airtime2 57 because the rates charged to
advertisers would likely become excessively expensive if a label was
forced to pay for every time a song was played. However, a complete ban
on pay-for-play would require that this option could no longer legally
extend to record labels. In effect, this would allow a fast food chain
pushing their new value meal to purchase airtime, while Epic Records,
trying to sell the listening public on their hot new artist, would be denied
that same opportunity. Although the government is typically granted
leniency in regulating radio broadcast airwaves, 258 to survive First
Amendment strict scrutiny, the government would nevertheless be required
to show a compelling government interest narrowly designed to advance a
legitimate government goal. 259  Because section 317 does not currently
foreclose the possibility of buying radio airtime, it is unclear whether the
courts, if presented with such a question, would find the total ban to be a
reasonable limitation on speech.
1. How the New System Would Work
Partial deregulation would improve the efficiency of radio
programming by allowing payment from a record company to a radio
station in exchange for a contractually enforceable guarantee of a specified
255. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). The mere fact that a
speaker seeks to profit from an expressive activity will not necessarily transform the activity into
commercial speech, deserving lessened First Amendment protection. Id. With respect to motion
pictures, musical recordings, books, or newspapers, the profit motive will typically run parallel
with an expressive content that is not necessarily commercial. See id.
256. See 47 U.S.C. § 317(b) (1994) (The only requirement to record companies purchasing
airtime is an appropriate source disclosure announcement.); David Hinckley, Stations Consider
Song Ads, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 2001, at 81, LEXIS, News, News Group File, All (noting
that Clear Channel at one point considered a plan to sell blocks of late-night airtime directly to
record labels).
257. See Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7 (explaining that stations are very reluctant to
"pepper their programming" with the required sponsorship disclosure announcements required
under the law).
258. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735-36 (1978). While content-based
regulations are typically deemed presumptively unconstitutional, the government is granted
greater leeway in regulating the radio broadcast airwaves. See id.
259. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(ruling that in order to withstand a challenge to First Amendment strict scrutiny the government
must demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to advance a sufficiently compelling
government interest).
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amount of airplay.260 The number of songs a label could secure would be
capped to ensure that a song's position on the charts could not be bought.
Record companies and radio stations would then adopt a standard contract
whereby the amount of airtime purchased and the price paid for such
airtime could be monitored. Because the nature of radio is of-the-
261moment, contracts between radio stations and record labels likely will be
a standard form contract to better accommodate timing demands.
a. Disclosure Requirements
The purchased airtime would still require disclosure; however, the
appropriate disclosure would be made to the FCC rather than the
amorphous disclosures made to the listening public at time of broadcast.2 62
The FCC would have the authority to require timely disclosure of all
monies paid, with failure to comply resulting in monetary sanctions better
reflective of total business revenue.2 63 Additionally, violation would result
in the more frequent denial of renewal of radio station licenses.
264
Although the cost for purchasing airtime would be determined by market
demand, the FCC would have the authority to oversee the payment terms of
the purchased airtime. This way, if the fees the radio stations charged to
260. Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 569; see also text accompanying note 212.
261. Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7. "'Because you only get 12 weeks for your record
to get any traction at radio. After 12 weeks the next wave of record company singles come over
the breach and if you don't have any traction you get washed away."' Id.
262. The legislative authorization for this disclosure procedure already exists under section
317(d) of the Communications Act. Section 317(d) currently authorizes the FCC to waive the
announcement requirements where "it determines that the public interest, convenience, or
necessity does not require the broadcasting of such announcement." 47 U.S.C. § 317(d) (1994).
Thus, "if Congress authorized the FCC to waive the requirement for disclosure entirely in certain
cases, it also authorized the FCC to mandate disclosure by some less intrusive (and, needless to
say, more efficient) alternative than by the on-the-air announcement at the time a record is
broadcast." Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 569.
263. The monetary sanctions levied for noncompliance should be such that they would
actually make a dent in the violator's pocket. The maximum penalty of $10,000, as currently set,
will do little to deter violation by billion-dollar corporations. See discussion supra Part II.B.
264. The FCC currently has this authority. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1999); see also discussion
supra Part I.B; H.R. REP. No. 86-1800, at 17 (1960). "Irrespective of which of these
administrative sanctions (i.e., revocation, suspension, or cease and desist order) the FCC may
contemplate.., nothing in section 312 as so amended is intended to prevent the FCC from
imposing, on the basis of the evidence adduced at the hearing, whichever sanction it deems
appropriate." Id. However, the FCC rarely invokes its power to revoke station licenses, but will
instead typically impose temporary suspension: "Revocation, of course, amounts to a death
sentence for the licensee. It may also have a serious effect upon the community served by the
licensee. Because of its severity, it has seldom if ever been invoked." Id. To ensure that radio
stations abide by the requirements, the FCC should more frequently invoke its power to
completely revoke station licenses rather than using minuscule fines.
2002]
680 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.22:643
secure airtime spiraled uncontrollably, the FCC could evaluate what action,
if any, would be required. The FCC would then be required to compile all
relevant data and provide it to the public on a monthly basis.
2 65
The decision would ultimately be left in the hands of the record labels
to determine for which songs payment will be made. For popular artists
that are likely to have songs played without payment, record labels may
choose to forego payment altogether. Radio stations that fail to play songs
of popular artists because payment is not made would do so at the risk of
alienating their own listeners. The price that radio stations set for the
airtime will be systematically computed by taking into consideration price
variations for peak and off-peak hours, the geographic market that the
station serves, and the artist's history of successful songs at that given
station. A scoring system that incorporates the above factors and
determines an appropriate rate for purchase would ensure that radio stations
cannot manipulate the price by charging vastly different fees to different
artists or by allowing record labels to engage in bidding wars for airtime.
With pay-for-play deregulation, justifiable concern may exist that
radio stations will simply replace independent promoters as the party
extorting massive amounts of money from record labels in order to have a
song broadcast.266 The main difference, however, is that because the
contractually enforceable purchased airtime could now legitimately and
systematically be disclosed to the FCC, radio stations would maintain an
accountability that is not now present with independent promoters.
Because radio stations, unlike independent promoters, provide a service
that ultimately thrives on their popularity with the listening public,267 the
mandatory monthly public disclosures will force radio stations to bear the
brunt of negative publicity if the contracted prices are entirely
unreasonable.
265. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 569-70 (similarly suggesting that, "the
FCC could require each licensed radio station to file with the Commission quarterly and annual
summaries of such data, which would be available for public inspection").
266. In 2001, when Clear Channel toyed with the idea of the eventual elimination of indies
by having record companies pay for late-night radio programming directly, shock waves rolled
through the music industry. See Lomax, supra note 148. The major concern, however, was that
because Clear Channel dominates much of the industry, the potential for abuse is great. See id.
While this Comment's proposed solution may help to alleviate many of the negative
consequences that payola produces, oversight of Clear Channel is a demon all its own.
267. In recent years, radio stations have been faced with a decrease in radio listening due to
the commercial overload in station programming. Boehlert, Radio's Big Bully, supra note 89
(explaining that radio listening has declined nearly fifteen percent over the past seven years). The
negative publicity associated with radio stations extorting massive amounts of money for listeners
to hear their favorite artists would not facilitate the radio station's objectives of increasing
listenership.
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b. The Problem of Finite Airtime
Record labels seeking to secure artist airtime would now approach
radio stations directly. In managing their finite airtime, radio stations may
benefit from several considerations. Although the problem cannot be
entirely eliminated, taken in conjunction, these considerations would help
alleviate finite airtime concerns.
With guaranteed airplay, record labels may initially be tempted to pay
for all of their artists' material. Radio stations, on the other hand, cannot
afford to fill airtime with too many substandard songs.268 A station that
supplies unpopular songs runs the risk of alienating traditional commercial
revenue and listener good faith.269 Allowing the stations to freely enter into
such contracts could also serve as an indicator of the future success of the
single or artist. Therefore, radio stations would have an incentive to
preview the song to determine the likelihood of its success, including using
listener call-ins and email requests as a gauge for listener response. 270 The
radio station may choose to forego entering into the contract, or if unsure of
the song's success, it may require the label to purchase airtime under the
maximum amount.
Further, the number of spins purchased would be limited to ensure
that a song's position on the charts could not be bought. The exact number
would be determined by a compromise among the record labels, radio
211
station owners, the FCC, and other sufficiently interested parties.
Record labels and radio stations may have reason to set a high number of
secured spins. The FCC, however, remembering the impetus behind payola
laws, can provide a voice of reason in the ultimate determination. The set
number of spins would reflect the ultimate regulatory goal-that the
secured airtime is but a compromise to help eradicate the inefficiencies and
dangers of the current payola system while preserving the ideal that a party
needs much more than money to secure radio airplay.
268. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
269. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
270. See, e.g., Price, supra note 210.
271. It is common for industries affected by congressional regulation to come together to
discuss the industry's future. Recently, musicians, members of Congress, record company
executives, Internet entrepreneurs, copyright lawyers, union representatives, and computer
experts gathered together at a conference to discuss how the future of music has been impacted by
the free streaming of music over the Internet. Jon Pareles, The Many Futures of Music, Maybe
One of Them Real, N.Y. TIMEsrS, Jan. 10, 2002, at BI. In fact, there have recently been calls to the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") to join together with both major and
independent record labels and recording artists to discuss rewriting current FCC payola rules.
Boehlert, Save Us from Ourselves, supra note 1.
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Finally, because the number of spins purchased would be limited,
there would be an incentive for the record label to contract with the radio
stations to spread out the spins rather than have them all played in a lumped
period of time. Dispersing the playtime over a period of approximately
three to four weeks-including alternating playtime during different hours
of the day-would help maximize the number of listeners the song could
reach in this initial trial period. In turn, this would also help ensure that no
one artist dominates the station's daily programming.
c. Synthesis by Hypothetical
Apart from checks specifically enumerated within these deregulation
guidelines, there are other checks inherent in a system that strikes a
compromise between a total ban of pay-for-play and the unfettered
capability to purchase airtime. Consider the following hypothetical:
Columbia Records hopes to launch a single of a virtually unheard of female
pop group named Movida. They contract with KISS FM in Los Angeles
for the maximum amount of spins that could legally be purchased (for
purposes of this hypothetical, the number will be set at thirty). Once the
radio station has fulfilled its contractual obligations, three possible
scenarios arise for the future of Movida's new single. First, the song may
receive an overwhelming response causing the radio station to continually
play the song after the contracted for airtime has expired. Second, the song
may gain marginal listener reviews, in which case the station may choose
to air the song on occasion. Third, the song may fail by receiving dismal
reviews, causing the station to pull it from rotation. In each scenario,
payment determinations for further airplay by record labels would be
resolved after the thirty contracted-for spins have come to pass, likely
eliminating the need to engage in further illicit unreported payments.
In the first instance, where the song receives overwhelming reviews,
there is no incentive for the record label to continue with legal or illegal
payment if the song is already a success. Continued payment would be a
waste of money and would provide no clearer results beyond what has
already been achieved. Where the song has failed to receive superior
reviews, it is unlikely that continued payment will do anything to further
the song's success. Rather than incurring more costs by promoting a
failing song, record labels will reject opportunities to engage in illicit
payments and will instead cut their losses. Where the song has only
received a moderate response, the answer is somewhat trickier. There may
still be some incentive for the record label to continue payment given the
song may have some potential to gain a greater response if play increases.
This is where the internal checks on radio station and record labels must be
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employed to ensure that there is no payment beyond the thirty contracted-
for spins. Because this new system would require the parties to turn over
detailed transactions to the FCC, enforcement of the hypothetical thirty-
spin maximum would make regulation more feasible.
2. The Future of Independent Promoters
Under this newly regulated environment, record companies and artists
could use the fees once provided to the indies to seek out promotional
avenues that promise clearer results.272 Record companies may choose to
increase artists' budgets to create music videos and interactive websites, or
they may choose to focus on promoting the album through an increase in
print promotion or television commercial time.273 This would ultimately
allow artists and their record labels to more accurately determine the most
effective way to promote both established and up-and-coming musical
artists.
Indies would not become extinct under this new system. Rather, they
likely would move back in-house with the record labels to serve as
legitimate facilitators of knowledge between the record companies, radio
stations, and services such as Billboard or Arbitron that track the progress
of record sales and airplay charts. Because the majority of indies maintain
274 asstrong relationships with radio stations in their given regions, they also
possess a considerable amount of knowledge about the type of music that
would prove to be successful on any given radio station in that area.275
272. Direct payment for broadcast may also be more beneficial for independent record
labels by reducing the speculation regarding promotional costs. As the president of the
independent label Rykodisc acknowledges,
If I had the opportunity to bet on my song, right now I've got to put money
on the table, and it may or may not get played.... If [however] I had an
opportunity to actually put the money on the table and let it get out there and
let the consumer decide, to me that's more attractive than allowing the
system to decide.
Pay-for-Play Sparks Debate, supra note 230.
273. Boehlert, Save Us from Ourselves, supra note 1. "Label sources suggest they would
rather spend their marketing dollars buying radio commercials to directly promote their artists to
consumers. But most record company budgets cannot support both large indie promotion and
advertising budgets." Id.
274. See Boehlert, Fighting Pay-for-Play, supra note 25.
275. In 1984, a preliminary investigation of independent promotion conducted by the Senate
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations concluded that independent promoters did provide
some significant benefits to the recording industry:
These promoters bring some continuity and stability to a very transient industry.
While radio station personnel often change employment throughout the United
States, independents maintain their geographic locations and their
acquaintanceships with the station personnel. It is also believed by some radio
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Indies could therefore continue to advise the record companies as to which
songs would require payment, to which regions of the country the song
should be targeted, and which songs are likely to be a hit.
Allowing record companies and artists to strategically dictate the time
and place of contracted-for airtime rather than paying a fee whenever a
station chooses to add a song disperses the power that is now concentrated
primarily in the hands of independent promoters. Accordingly, the industry
will move toward a more efficient and effective system for determining
potential hit records. As it stands today, indies invoice the record company
with the addition of every song, which provides indies with an incentive to
get as many songs as possible added to a station's playlist. Under this new
system, indies will now get paid for rendering an actual service rather than
for providing a quick solution around an ill-equipped and illogical law.
V. CONCLUSION
Payola is, and always will be, a reality of the music industry. Reality
continuously reminds artists, record labels, and radio stations that the music
business is, in fact, a business. Artists do not eat, sleep, and buy million
dollar homes on the warm, fuzzy feelings that they provide their fans.
Record labels do not front artist signing fees and production costs out of the
kindness of their hearts. Radio station conglomerates are not able to
generate billion dollar revenues by simply providing the listener with the
newest hit single.
As the music industry is a business, the laws must better adapt to
balance business reality with the desires for a more honest and efficient
music community.276 Although seemingly at odds, the music industry,
stations that independent record promoters who work a variety of record labels
bring objectivity and experience to promotion of a record that a company promoter
would not bring because of his vested interest in the company's product.
Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 121, at 530. "The problem for record companies has always
been that there are too many radio stations-and too many egos-nationwide for label staffers to
keep close tabs on. So they need to hire indies, people with close business relationships in
different markets." Boehlert, Pay for Play, supra note 7.
276. Despite persistent calls for congressional inquiry, it is unclear-given the events of
September 11, 2000-whether Congress will choose to take the time to implement the needed
change. See generally Roberts, Playola, supra note 129 ("[W]ith the Justice Department focusing
on identifying terrorist cells and Congress embroiled in wartime security matters, attempts to
create regulations or pass bills curtailing it aren't even near the stove, let alone on a back
burner."). While it is unclear what exactly needs to happen before Congress is willing to
adequately confront an issue that has plagued the music industry for over a century, the current
antitrust investigation into Clear Channel seems to provide a sufficient starting point. See
generally Taking on the Empire, supra note 95; Philips, Conyers to Press, supra note 81 (noting
that the investigation into the monopolistic practices by Clear Channel has caused some,
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Congress, and the FCC must be prepared to work together to adopt ways in
which these goals can coexist. Without compromise and consistency in
enforcement of the laws, the music industry will continuously be plagued
by payola's scandal and uncertainty.
Lauren J. Katunich *
including Representative Conyers, to rethink the current payola laws). However, although "cries
for government investigations have sometimes been answered," the payola investigation typically
fizzles when more pressing political issues or agendas come into play. SEGRAVE, supra note 14,
at ix (noting that in the late 1980s then-Senator Al Gore promised a full investigation into payola,
only to drop the issue to pursue an unsuccessful bid for the 1988 Democratic presidential
nomination). Although this Comment proposes what the author believes to be a reasonable
solution, Congress, the FCC, and the music industry must step up to the plate to affect change.
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